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BOOK REVIEW
Uniform Law for InternationalSales Under the 1980 United Nations
Convention. By John Honnold. Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Law and Taxation, 1982. Pp. 586.

In 1980, a Diplomatic Conference of sixty-two states unanimously
approved the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. This action concluded almost fifty years of effort
to unify the law for the international sale of goods and, in the process,
superseded the frequently criticized 1964 Hague Convention on the
Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (ULF). Since that time, 21 states, including the United States,
have signed the 1980 Convention and 2 states have ratified it.
Over the last twenty-five years John Honnold, Schnader Professor
of Commercial Law at the University of Pennsylvania, has been deeply
involved in the developments leading to the 1980 Convention. He has
been a perceptive commentator on the process of unification' and, from
1969 to 1974 served as Chief of the International Trade Branch of the
United Nations. In addition, he represented the United States as a
delegate to the 1964 Hague Convention, as a participant at various
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working
Groups leading up to the 1978 Draft Convention,2 and with Professor
E. Allan Farnsworth as a delegate to the 1980 Diplomatic Conference.
It will come as no surprise to learn, therefore, that he has written Uniform Lawfor InternationalSales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention an important book that should become an indispensable tool
for working with the text of the 1980 Convention.

I

See, e.g., Honnold, The United Nations Commission on InternationalTrade Law: Mission
and Methods, 27 AM. J. COMp. LAW 201 (1979); Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contractsfor
the InternationalSale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. COMp. LAW 223 (1979); Honnold, The
Uniform Lawfor the InternationalSale oGoods: The Hague Convention of 1964, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1965); Honnold,A Unform Lawfor InternationalSales, 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 299
(1959).
2 The author of this review had the privilege of representing the United States at the fifth
session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's Working Group on the
International Sale of Goods in Geneva in January 1974.
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II
The 1980 Convention consists of 101 Articles and is divided into
four parts. Part I, entitled "Sphere of Application and General Provisions," covers Articles 1-13. Part II, entitled "Formation of Contract,"
covers Articles 12-24. Part III which covers Articles 25-88, is entitled
"Sale of Goods," and includes sections on "General Provisions," "Obligations of the Seller," "Obligations of the Buyer," "Passing of Risk"
and "Provisions Common to the Obligations of the Seller and Buyer."
Part IV, entitled "Final Provisions," covers Articles 89-101. In assaying this structure, Professor Honnold states that his objective is to assist, through "intensive analysis and factual examples," in the
understanding and application of the Convention to "modem commercial transactions" and to "see this new law as an organic whole. ' 3 The
purpose of this review is to assess how well he has accomplished his
objective.
As a predicate to his commentary, the author provides a detailed
discussion of the legislative history and development of the 1980 Convention. He includes a guide on how to find the principal documents
and reports, and a recap of the steps, procedures and participants in the
development.4 The appendices contain the text of the 1980 Convention, the 1978 Draft United Nations Convention on the International
Sale of Goods, and the 1964 Hague Conventions, along with a useful
concordance to ease the transition. Finally, the commentary on each
article contains, at a minimum, a footnote on its legislative history and,
frequently, more extended discussion of the particular developments
since the ULIS.5 Readers, therefore, can learn much between the covers of this book about the history of the 1980 Convention, and in addition are frequently directed in citations to diverse sources of legislative
history and academic commentary. 6 In this respect alone, the book is
invaluable.
In an effort to "help the reader see this new law as an organic
3 J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATION'S CONVENTION 5 (1982) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES].

4 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 37-43, 49-56.
5 A good example is the commentary on Article 79 discussing "exemptions" from liability.
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 426-43.
6 An exhaustive bibliography of books, reports, conventions, statutes, and general conditions
is provided in the book. UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 29-34. An important
source of background material for the 1980 Convention is the United Nations Conference on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19
(1981), which contains documents of the conference and summary records of the plenary meetings, and of the meetings of the main committees. [hereinafter cited as Official Records].
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whole," Professor Honnold next highlights some "salient features" of
the 1980 Convention. These are features of "special significance, including issues that underlie the entire Convention." 7 Perhaps it is correct to say that he has identified basic principles and policies that
should influence the scope and interpretation of the Convention and its
application to particular disputes. The themes developed in this section
recur throughout the commentary to follow, thus it is important to read
and understand the "salient features" before reading the commentary.
Finally, Professor Honnold presents the Commentary, which occupies all but 34 of the 460 sections of the book. At this section he encounters a dilemma. Although he discusses each of the 101 Articles in
chronological order, there is no obvious topical or "functional" analysis
beyond that dictated by the organization and structure of the 1980
Convention. Must the reader, therefore, start from the beginning and
read to the end, performing miracles of self-integration along the way?
The answer is no. Honnold has developed a methodology, building
upon the "salient features" he highlighted, to integrate the Convention
and build a continuing narrative as each article is considered. He provides a comprehensive index, a detailed table of contents, a concise
overview of the Convention,8 and in addition, typically provides the
following assistance as the reader confronts the sections relevant to a
particular article:
1. An introductory note crisply reminds us of what has been
discussed before, tells us what will be considered in the forthcoming material, and may also comment on the nature of the problem
or the relationship of the particular article under discussion to
other articles.
2. The particular article is quoted verbatim and there is a
short footnote highlighting its legislative history.
3. The article is analyzed and the discussion may include illustrative examples, legislative history, policy implications, comparisons with current domestic law, references to scholarly
discussions, and less frequently, an indication of the legal tradition
from which the core idea emerged.
4. There may be a brief summary or a transition to the next
article, and points developed earlier may be reiterated.'
7 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at

57-71.

8 See UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at §§ 36, 131, and 180.
9 For commentary on a relatively discrete problem where the model is effectively employed,
see the treatment of "Passing of Risk," UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 367-90.
Professor Honnold describes his method as follows:
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Simply stated, the analysis of each article is skillfully woven into a unified approach to the entire Convention that contrasts with domestic
law, and considers fundamental policies, legislative history and practical applications. On balance, the approach is highly successful.
III
The true test of Professor Honnold's method occurs when it is applied to a particular problem. Suppose that you represent a buyer of
goods entering into international contracts for the sale of goods, and he
has requested your advice upon the right of a buyer to "cancel" or
"rescind" a contract where the seller has delivered goods that do not
conform to the contract. This is a recurring and troublesome question
in both international and domestic law.' 0 With Professor Honnold's
book in one hand and your yellow pad in the other, what answer
emerges?
In this case, starting at the index yields immediate results.
Whether you first look under "cancellation" or "rescission," you are
referred to "avoidance" and there you strike gold. There are cross references to "fundamental breach," "cure," "notice fixing final period,"
"remedies," and "restitution," and direct references to fifteen separate
topics, including "avoidance by the buyer."" In addition, the book
contains a detailed table of contents which points to, among other
things, Article 49 entitled "Buyer's Right to Avoid the Contract." Finally, Professor Honnold has provided brief introductions to various
parts of the Convention that help in developing an overview. Thus, we
are provided a functional overview for what follows.
Before tackling the Commentary, however, one must first read the
material on "salient features," because in section 27 Professor Honnold
provides an introduction to "avoidance" and limitations upon avoidance. We are told that avoidance is one of the "thorniest problems" in
the law of sales, that no domestic legal system has developed a satisfactory approach to it, and that the problem has special significance "beFor each of the major divisions of the Convention, the analysis of specific provisions is preceded by an introduction that exposes the relationship between this and the other parts of the
Convention. The examples.. . yield an unexpected dividend: Working out a solution for
these specific cases often brings different parts of the Convention into play and illustrates the

Convention's structure.
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 5-6.
10 For Professor Honnold's analysis of the problem under American sales law, see Honnold,

Buyer'r Right ofRejection-4 Study in the Impact of Codr cation Upon a Commercial Problem, 97
U. PA. L. REv. 457 (1949). For the seller's right to avoid the contract upon breach by the buyer,
see Article 64 and UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 362-64.
11 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALE

at 568.
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cause of the cost of transporting goods to a distant buyer and the
difficulty of disposing of rejected goods in a foreign country" are
high. 2 These considerations prompted the Convention to adopt "rules
that can save the contract from destruction on technical grounds."' 3
With this anti-avoidance policy established, we then are alerted that
avoidance has two primary limitations: (1) the party in breach has
power to "cure" the breach, and (2) the breach must be "fundamental."
We also are told that there is one important expansion of the right to
avoid the contract; if there is a failure to perform that is not fundamental, the aggrieved party "may fix a final, additional period for performance" and a failure by the seller to deliver within that time is grounds
for avoidance.' 4 This is the "famous Nachfrist notice, adapted from
German law," upon which Professor Honnold lavishes great attention
throughout the Commentary.' 5
The contours have been established, now the reader has a choice:
either read through the Commentary from start to finish, or jump right
into the stream by starting with the commentary to Article 49, sections
301-308. If you have taken the steps recommended above, including
reading the "salient features," starting with Article 49 can be productive due to the discussion method employed by Professor Honnold. To
illustrate, in the commentary to Article 49: (1) section 301 provides a
brief study of the problem of avoidance in domestic law, including the
United Kingdom, the United States, France and Germany; (2) section
302 includes a reminder of earlier comments upon "cure," "fundamental breach" and the Nachfrisl notice, as well as a verbatim reprint of
Article 49 and a footnote on its legislative history; (3) sections 303 to
305 briefly summarize two grounds for avoidance, "fundamental
breach" and "non-delivery within time fixed by the Nachfrist notice,"
but there are no examples offered because these grounds are explored
in the commentary on Articles 25 and 49; and (4) sections 306 to 308
discuss in some detail, but without illustrations, the limitations imposed
by Article 49(2) on the time for avoidance. There is no concluding
section looking forward to additional comments on avoidance, and the
overall discussion is a bit sparse. 16 It is crucial, therefore, that the
reader turn back to the commentary on (1) fundamental breach in Article 25, (2) how avoidance is declared in Article 26, (3) the seller's right
12 UNIFoRM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at

65.

13 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 65.
14 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 65-66.
15 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at §§ 287-91, 305.
16 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 315-21.
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to cure defects in performance in Articles 37 and 48, and (4) the Nachfrist notice in Article 47.
"Fundamental" breach is defined in Article 25:
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it
results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him
of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in
breach did not forsee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the
same circumstances would not have forseen such a result.
In his commentary on Article 25, Professor Honnold stresses that fundamental breach is a limitation on the "right" to avoid a contract, discusses the legislative history of Article 25 and provides two illustrations
of how the fundamental breach concept does not depend solely upon
the degree of deviation from expectations under the contract. The first
illustration reveals that a breach, otherwise substantial, may not be fundamental if the seller offers to cure it under Articles 37 or 48, and the
second shows that a breach, otherwise unsubstantial, may become fundamental if the seller refuses to grant a refund or a price adjustment to
the extreme inconvenience of the buyer. In other words, the seller's
conduct either at or after the breach may mitigate what would otherwise be a fundamental breach or exacerbate the effect of a relatively
minor deviation. The commentary on Article 25 concludes with a listing of the articles where fundamental breach is an important concept,
including the buyer's right to specific performance under Article
46(2).17
Enough has been said to suggest what Professor Honnold's
method generally will yield. With the ground work on avoidance by
the buyer laid in the commentaries on Articles 49 and 25, the reader
can proceed to the discussions in Article 26 of the notice required to
declare an avoidance, the scope of the seller's right to cure nonconformities before and after delivery in Articles 37 and 48, and the German
Nachfrist notice in Article 49. In addition, there is useful commentary
employing the same methodology on the buyer's remedies and duties
after an avoidance is declared in Articles 75 and 76 and 81 through 84,
17 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALEs at 211-16. Article 45(l)(a) of the 1980 Convention provides that if the "seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract... the
" UNIFORM LAw FOR INTERNAbuyer may ... exercise the rights provided in articles 46-52 ...
TIoNAL SALES at 483. If that breach is a tender of non-conforming goods, the buyer "may require
delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of
contract" and a proper notice is given under Article 39. Article 46(2) reprintedin UNIFORM LAW
FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 484. The 1980 Convention reflects a preference for specific relief
over damages and, according to Professor Honnold, this is a case where the civil law prevailed
over the common law, where damages are the rule and specific performance the exception. UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 300.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

5:432(1983)

and the buyer's duties with regard to goods in his possession at the time
of avoidance in Articles 85 through 88.18 The same clear, analytical
style, with occasional illustrations and frequent attention to legislative
history and domestic law, is revealed in the overall avoidance commentary, as well as in other articles of the 1980 Convention.
IV
Despite this effective methodology, the book has some definite
limitations when applied to the buyer's right of avoidance. First, because of the choice of methodology, the reader must work hard to apply the commentary to the particular issue. Other than the index, there
is no single place where the conditions for and consequences of avoidance are adequately spelled out. Nevertheless, the assistance offered by
Professor Honnold stimulates inquiry and is far more enlightening than
working with only the text of the 1980 Convention. Second, although
Honnold stresses the primary role of contract and the importance of
usages, practices, and flexibility in international sales, 19 this is not a
book about the realities of international commercial practice. There is
no systematic attempt to develop these themes around the avoidance
issue, and although some patterns and practices emerge in the illustrations, they are fragmentary. A continuing impression is that despite the
promise offered by the "salient features," Professor Honnold is required to deal with a Convention produced more through compromise
among competing legal traditions than one derived from or responsive
to the needs and practices of international trade.2 0 , Third, there is no
critical assessment of the general policies and objectives underlying the
Convention or how they are implemented or frustrated by particular
articles. In his commentary on avoidance, Professor Honnold assumes
that the policy against destruction of the contract on technical grounds
is sound; and that this policy is implemented in the complex and often
baffling articles on fundamental breach and cure.
18 See UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALEs at 217-18 (notice of avoidance); 270-73,
309-14 (cure); 315-16 (Nachfrist); 412-16, 446-55 (post-avoidance remedies and effect); 456-63
(preservation of goods).
19 See UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 47-48, 60-62, 105-35, 144-49.
20 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 67-71. Cf. Berman, The Uniform Law of
InternationalSale of Goods: A ConstructiveCritique,30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 354, 368 (1965),
where the author states:
Codification of the law of international sales must, if it is to be successful, grow out of custom
and belief-and, in particular, out of the common experience and shared concepts of the
international trading community ....
[Iln the commercial field, at least, legislation must
not only reflect usage and refer to it, but must also develop and refine it. Otherwise legislation is not needed; and in law, surely, what is not necessary to do is necessary not to do.
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A final source of puzzlement, if not disappointment, is Professor
Honnold's treatment of fundamental breach in his commentary on Article 25. Fundamental breach is an important limitation upon the right
of either the seller or buyer to avoid the contract; its definition and
administrability are therefore relevant to how well the 1980 Convention's anti-avoidance policy will be achieved.
Under Section 10 of the ULIS, the test of fundamental breach was
whether the "party in breach knew, or ought to have known, at the time
of the conclusion of the contract, that a reasonable person in the same
situation as the other party would not have entered into the contract if
he had foreseen the breach and its effects." 2 One readily can agree
with Professor Honnold that this test is "complex and fanciful, for it
asks a tribunal to make an estimate concerning a hypothetical prediction that one party would not have made about what the other party
would have done if he had known facts that did not yet exist."22 Thus,
it was clear early in the UNCITRAL drafting process that fundamental
'23
breach "must be redefined in terms of the materiality of the breach.
The result is Article 25 of the 1980 Convention which, as shown
previously, provides that a breach is fundamental if it "results in such a
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he
is entitled to expect under the contract unless the party in breach did
not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result. ' 24 According to Professor Honnold, the phrase before "unless" focuses upon the
"performance that was promised at the time of the making of the contract" and the phrase after "unless" focuses upon the serious consequences that "become evident subsequent to the making of the
contract."2 5 Thus, according to Honnold, there may be a minor deviation in what the aggrieved party was "entitled to expect," but a fundamental breach will occur when the breacher "willfully deviates from
the contract . . . at a time when he should know that his deviation
would cause serious detriment to the other party. '26 The overall effect
of this interpretation is to tie the buyer's right to avoid more to the
seller's conduct at the time of the breach than to the materiality of his
non-performance. Thus, the seller can (1) "cure" what otherwise is a
fundamental breach, (2) promote a minor breach into a fundamental
21 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 545.
22 UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 212.
23
24
25
26

UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 212.
Article 25 reprinted in UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 477.
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALE at 213.
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 213.
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breach by refusing to grant a price or quantity adjustment,2 7 and
(3) commit a fundamental breach because a substantial detriment was
reasonably foreseen at the time of breach although not at the time of
contracting.
Before reading the following comments on this interpretation, it is
important to recall the distinction between direct and consequential
losses caused by a breach. From the buyer's standpoint, the distinction
is between the loss suffered because the buyer did not receive what he
was entitled to under the contract, measured by the difference between
the contract price and, for example, the cost to obtain a substitute performance,2 8 and the loss suffered because the defective performance interfered with or prevented an intended use of the goods, such as a
resale. In this latter case, the damages may include profits lost on the
intended resale if, as Article 74 provides, the seller "foresaw or ought to
have foreseen" them at the "time of the conclusion of the contract. 29
Unlike Article 25, as interpreted by Professor Honnold, there is nothing
to suggest that if a seller did not reasonably foresee lost resale profits at
the time of contracting but did foresee them at the time of a wilful or
other breach, he would be liable for them under Article 74. From the
juxtaposition of Articles 25 and 74, therefore, emerges the curious possibility that if a seller, who at the time of breach but not at the time of
contracting, can foresee that breach would cause a serious loss in the
buyer's planned use of the goods, the breach may be fundamental.
Thus, avoidance would be justified, but the buyer may be unable to
recover for any consequential losses.
Assuming that Professor Honnold's "time of breach" interpretation of Article 25 is sound, the interesting policy question is why the
1980 Convention imposes a fault concept at the time of the breach to
expand the rights of avoidance but rejects that approach where the expansion of liability for consequential damages would result. A possible
answer is that the assumed policy reasons for limiting avoidance are
less persuasive where the seller, whose interest is protected by the policy, has, without offering to cure or to adjust, committed a breach with
27 See, e.g., Articles 46 & 75 of the 1980 Convention. Cf.U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (1977).
28 As another example, suppose the buyer has contracted to buy factory equipment from the
seller to expand the capacity of his plant. The seller fails to deliver and, even with reasonable
efforts, it will take the buyer three months to purchase substitute goods from a third party. The
buyer's "direct" damages will be the cost in excess of the contract price to purchase substitute
goods, plus the reasonable expenses incurred, in effect the "cover," and the consequential damages
will be any profits lost in the planned expansion because of the delay. See U.C.C. §§ 2-712(l); 2715(2)(a) (1977).
29 Cf.Adams, Hadley v. Baxendale andthe Contract/Tort Dichotomy, 8 ANGLO-AMERICAN L.
REv. 147 (1978).

Book Review
5:432(1983)
reason to know that the buyer will suffer a substantial detriment. This
conduct strongly suggests bad faith, if not a tort.3" On the other hand,
the seller's fault at the time of breach may not undercut the usual reasons, lodged in contract theory, for excluding consequential losses not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting. 3' However interesting these questions may be, the curious juxtaposition of Article 25 with
its importance for the right of avoidance, and Article 74 with its limitation on consequential damages, is not discussed by Professor Honnold.
The more interesting question is whether Professor Honnold's conclusion is sound that the phrase after "unless" in Article 25 applies to a
detriment the seller could reasonably foresee at the time of breach.
This conclusion is not easily supported by the language of Article 25.
To be fundamental, the breach must result in substantial detriment,
and substantiality is measured by what the buyer is "entitled to expect
under the contract." Put another way, the seller's non-conforming performance must be compared to the buyer's "entitled" expectations
under the contract. In damage parlance, the detriment resulting would
be direct, rather than consequential. The phrase after "unless," although silent as to the time of foreseeability, refers explicitly to the
detriment resulting from deprivations of what the buyer "is entitled to
expect under the contract."'3 2 It is that detriment which the seller must
foresee and because it is determined by the terms of the contract, the
apparent reference point is to the time of contracting rather than the
time of breach.
This reading of Article 25, plausible though it may be, undercuts
the independent effect of the "unless" clause, for it will be hard for the
seller to show that he could not reasonably foresee what direct and
substantial detriment, measured by contract expectations, will result
from a breach. This may argue for, but does not fully explain, Profes30 Article 7(1) of the 1980 Convention directs that the "observance of good faith in international trade" be considered in the "interpretation" of the Convention. The scope and content of
good faith, however, is far from clear. See UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 61-62,
123-25.
31 According to Comment (a) to Section 351 of the American Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a "contracting party is generally expected to take account of those risks that are foreseeable
at the time he makes the contract" but that he is not "liable in the event of breach for loss that he
did not at the time of contracting have reason to foresee as a probable result of such breach."
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 comment a (1979). Cf. Hadley v. Baxendale, [1854] 156
Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (unjust to impose liability for consequences unknown at the time of con-

tracting for "had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided
for the breach of contract by special terms.
...). See UNiFoRm LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
SALEs at 411, where Professor Honnold suggests that under French law a claim for damages not

foreseeable at the time of contracting might lie if the breach was willful.

32 Article 25 reprintedin UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 477.
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sor Honnold's conclusion that foreseeability is relevant to the time of
breach. Except for a cryptic comment that the 1980 Convention's departure from the "time of contracting" test of foreseeability has been
criticized as "unfair, ' 33 nothing is said about the potentially conflicting
interpretation derived from the final version of Article 25.
Some additional light can be shed by a more complete reading of
the legislative history of Article 25. A 1976 draft definition of fundamental breach provided: "A breach committed by one of the parties to
the contract is fundamental if it results in substantial detriment to the
other party and the party in breach foresaw or had reason to foresee
such a result."3 4 Article 23 of the 1978 Draft Convention defined Fundamental Breach as: "A breach committed by one of the parties to the
contract is fundamental if it results in substantial detriment to the party
unless the party in breach foresaw or had reason to foresee such a result."' 35 According to Professor Michida, the delegate from Japan, substitution of "unless" for "and" was intended to shift the burden of
proving that the detriment was not foreseeable from the aggrieved
party to the breacher. Those delegates who favored a broader right to
avoid, urged that it was unfair to require the aggrieved party to prove
both substantial detriment and that it could have been foreseen by the
breaching party.3 6 These arguments carried the day and Michida's conclusion on the burden of proof is confirmed in the Commentary by the
United Nations Secretariat on Article 23 of the 1978 Draft.37
The Secretariat's Commentary on the 1978 version of Article 23
also offered two other interpretations: first, the concept of "substantial
detriment" was to be made in the circumstances of each case, including
the "extent to which the breach interferes with other activities of the
injured party,"3 and second, the phrase after "unless" does not specify
33 See UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 213 n.3. This is no suggestion as to why

this might be unfair to the aggrieved party. But see infra note 29.
34 Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/116, annex I
(1976), reprintedin [1976] 7 Y.B. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW 90, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/

1976 (emphasis added).
35 See Report of the Comm. on Int'l Trade Law on the work of its 1 th Session, (No. 17) U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979), at Ch. II, para. 28, reprintedin Official Records, supra note 6,
at 7 (emphasis added). See also UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 516.

36 See Michida, Cancellationof Contract, 27 AM. J. OF COMP. LAW 279 (1979), where this
drafting history is discussed. Professor Michida, an advocate of less rather than more avoidance,
urged that even with the "unless" language, the definition of fundamental breach should be expressly conditioned upon the failure of the seller to cure. This proposal was rejected as unnecessary and superfluous. UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 214 n.4.

37 Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
prepared by the Secretariat, reprintedin Official Records, supra note 6, at 26.
38 Id.
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at "what moment the party in breach should have foreseen the consequences of the breach, whether at the time the contract was concluded
or at the time of the breach," and in case of dispute "that decision must
be made by the tribunal." 39 Thus, a persuasive interpretation of Article
23 prior to the 1980 Convention was that "substantial detriment" included both direct and consequential loss and the relevant time for
foreseeability could be the time of breach.
When the Diplomatic Convention convened in March 1980, Articles 1 through 82 of the 1978 Draft Convention were referred to the
First Committee for consideration, with the expectation that any approved amendments would be submitted to a Drafting Committee of
the First Committee and then to the Plenary Session.' The debate on
Article 23 was extensive, covering more than eight pages in the Summary Records of the First Committee.4 The United Kingdom, pursuing an objection made to the 1978 Draft, proposed that the phrase "at
the time when the contract was concluded" be inserted between the
words "unless" and "the party in breach." 4 This proposal was withdrawn upon consideration of the opposing view that information provided after the conclusion of the contract could "modify the situation
as regards both substantial detriments and foresight" and that the
wording of Article 23 "should therefore be flexible. '4 3 Afterwards
without apparent reference to the United Kingdom proposals, an ad
hoc working group reported an amendment proposed by the Federal
Republic of Germany that the breach is fundamental if it "results in
such detriment to the other party as will substantially impair his expectations under the contract."4 This amendment, which the First Committee adopted by a 22 to 18 vote, along with a change in the content of
39 Id.

40 For a brief discussion of this process, see UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 54-

56.
41 See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.I/SR.13, reprintedin Official Records, supra note 6, at 295303.
42 Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/I 1, reprintedin Official Records,
supra note 6, at 99.
43 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.l/SR.13, reprintedin Official Records, supra note 6, at 302. See
also, Analysis of Comments: Proposals by Governments & Int'l Organizations on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the Int'l Sale of Goods and on Draft Provisions Concerning Implementation, Reservations and Other Final Clauses, prepared by the Secretariat General, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.97/9, reprintedinOfficial Records, supra note 6, at 76, where the United Kingdom's objection to the 1978 draft of Article 23 is summarized.
44 See Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/l1 (Apr. 7, 1980), reprintedin
Official Records, supra note 6, at 82, 98-99. The proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany
also reflected an earlier objection made to Article 23 of the 1978 Draft. See supra note 34; Official
Records, supra note 6, at 76.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

5:432(1983)

the foreseeability test,4 5 was incorporated into Article 23 and submitted
to the Drafting Committee in the following form:
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it
results in such detriment to the other party as will substantially impair his
expectations under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee
such a result and that a reasonable person4 6of the same kind in the same
circumstances would not have foreseen it.
A final version, with minor revisions, was submitted to the Plenary Session and adopted as Article 25 by a vote of 42 to 2, with two
abstentions.4 7
The conclusion to be derived from this brief excursion into the
legislative history thicket is still far from clear. On the one hand, Professor Honnold's interpretation that foreseeability may be determined
at the time of breach is supported by the comments of the United Nations' Secretariat on the 1978 Draft and the United Kingdom's decision
in the face of strong opposition to withdraw its proposal which would
limit foreseeability to the "time the contract was concluded. ' 4 This
interpretation, of course, favors avoidance for it holds the seller accountable for substantial detriment which should have been foreseen at
the time of breach. On the other hand, the amendment proposed by
the Federal Republic of Germany and adopted by the Plenary Session
narrowed the definition of "detriment." Article 25, as a result of the
narrower definition combined with the phrase after "unless," has the
overall effect of tying foreseeability to the narrower detriment resulting
from expectations created at the time of contracting. Professor Peter
Schlectriem finds this reading of Article 25 persuasive, and suggests
that the objective of the withdrawn United Kingdom proposal was
achieved indirectly when the proposal of the Federal Republic of Germany was adopted by the Plenary Session.49 Regardless of the sound45 See the statement of Mr. Shafk from Egypt, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.I/SR.12, reprinted
in Official Records, supra note 6, at 295. The Egyptian proposal, with modifications, was approved by the First Committee by a vote of 26 to 14. See Report of the First Committee, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.97/1 1, reprintedin Official Records supra note 6, at 98-99.
46 Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/1 1, reprinted in Official Records,
supra note 6, at 99.
47 See Report of the First Committee of the Plenary Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/11
and Add.l&2, reprinted in Official Records, supra note 6, at 206. The interpretation problem
raised here was not discussed in the explanations by States as to why they dissented or abstained.
48 A reading of the Summary Records of the First Committee's discussion of Article 23 of the
1978 Draft reveals a persistent sentiment in favor of flexibility in the timing of foreseeability. See
supra note 33; Official Records, supra note 6, at 295-303.
49 See P. SCHLECTRIEM, EINHEIGLICHES UN-KAUFRECHT 46-49 (1981). Apparently Professors Schlectriem and Honnold failed to agree on this one in their "full day of animated critique
discussion." UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 9-10.
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ness of this conclusion, the important difference from this review's
standpoint is that Professor Schlectriem directly considered the effect of
the German proposal while Professor Honnold did not.
V
The strengths of this impressive text are clear. Professor Honnold
has succeeded in helping all of us to understand and to apply the 1980
Convention. The method employed in the commentary, the numerous
research aids, the mix of history, comparative law and policy, and the

consistently clear writing justify the conclusion that the book is an indispensable aid to working with the text of the 1980 Convention. Even
for the "semi-initiated," the book provides a rich and sophisticated in-

sight into the process of unification of international sales law-a process that will not stop with the 1980 Convention.
The limitations, which are implicit in the book's stated objectives,
emerge when the reader explores the commentary for answers to partic-

ular questions. At some point in the analysis it becomes clear that not
all the questions are answered, not all of the inter-relationships are explored, and not all of the underlying policies are developed and evaluated. Further, there is no systematic comparison between the 1980
Convention and any particular domestic law of sales.50 But these limitations are by design rather than omission. The first task after the com-

pletion of such a monumental international project is to provide clear
analysis and basic understanding. Critical evaluation can come later.
Even so, there is more depth here than one is accustomed to find in a
50 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the buyer's right to avoid or "cancer' the contract
for breach by the seller is defined in Section 2-711(1). U.C.C. § 2-711(l)(1977); see U.C.C. 2106(4)(1977) (cancellation occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for breach). The
scope of the right is determined by the nature of the breach and whether delivery is to be tendered
and accepted in installments. In the latter case, a "non-conformity or default with respect to one
or more installments" must substantially impair the value of the whole contract before cancellation is justified. U.C.C. § 2-612(3)(1977). If the contract is entire, a failure to deliver the goods
must go to the "whole" contract, U.C.C. § 2-711(1)(1977), and a repudiation must be "with respect
to a performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract to
the other," U.C.C. § 2-610(1977), before cancellation is justified. Cancellation also may be justified where the buyer "rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance" where the goods or the
tender of delivery fail to conform to the contract. Whether a rejection is rightful is determined by
U.C.C. § 2-601 and a group of sections relevant to that question, and whether a revocation of
acceptance is justifiable is determined by U.C.C. § 2-608. U.C.C. §§ 2-601, 2-608 (1977). For
analysis of these problems, see e.g., Priest, Breach and Remedyfor the Tender of Non-Conforming
Goods under the UCC. An Economic Approach, 91 HARv.L. Rnv. 960 (1978). See also, Minter,
Buyer's Right ofReectiornA Quarter Century Under the U.C.C., and Recent ZnternationalDevelopments, 13 GA. L. REv. 805 (1979).
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basic text and this suggests that the book also will serve as a foundation
piece for the flow of critical scholarship that is bound to follow.
Nevertheless, I remain intrigued by why Professor Honnold,
surely one of the initiated in these matters, glossed over a major change
in the definition of fundamental breach between the 1978 Draft and the
1980 Convention. The interpretation issue is apparent to even the
semi-initiated and the answer is important to the scope of the avoidance right because, if Professor Schlectriem's conclusion is sound, the
change will further narrow the buyer's right to avoid. Even if the seller
could foresee a substantial detriment at the time of breach, there is no
fundamental breach if the seller would "not have foreseen" that detriment as "substantially to deprive

. .

. [the buyer]

. .

of what he is

entitled to expect under the contract."'" Surely the policy implications
of that drafting change deserved some comment.
One possible explanation is that the amendment slipped through
the First Committee and the Plenary Session without adequate discussion of its probable effect. In addition Professor Honnold, along with
several other delegates favoring flexibility in the time for foreseeability,
would probably be surprised by the alleged effect of the amendment.
Clearly, Honnold's interpretation in the text is consistent with the Secretariat's view of Article 23 in the 1978 Draft, and with the United
Kingdom's withdrawal of the amendment explicitly worded to tie foreseeability to the time of contracting. The surprise theory also is bolstered by Honnold's consistent position in the text that limitations on
avoidance in international trade are sound. One might have expected
an advocate of a particular position to seize upon an amendment apparently limiting the scope of avoidance as evidence supporting that
policy. But, Professor Honnold does not discuss the amendment much
less seize upon it. 2
51 Article 25 reprinted in UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES at 477.

52 In response to an inquiry from the author of this review, Professor Honnold conceded that
his discussion was "too brief' and offered apost hoc response to Peter Schlectriem's interpretation.
The essence of the argument is that the amendment proposed by the Federal German Republic
went to the substantiality of the detriment incurred rather than to the foreseeability of loss at the
time of contracting. He stressed that under Draft Article 23 of the 1978 Draft, foreseeability was
not limited to the time of contracting and that the United Kingdom's amendment, which limited
foreseeability for avoidance purposes to the time of contracting, was rejected. In light of the
legislative history, the question was whether the language of Article 25 restricted foreseeability to
the time of the making of the contract. He concludes that the answer is no.
In terms of syntax, this question. . . is left open, with the nearer reference made to 'breach'
rather than making. On balance, the lack of support for the UK proposal and the failure of
the Conference expressly to take a decision on this point would deny to the Drafting Committee the authority to inject this idea in the drafting process. And there is one point on which
the leaders of the Conference and the Drafting Committee were insistent--4he same idea was
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One unexplained omission or gloss does not a bad book make.
Rather, it simply warns that even the initiated have difficulty in analyzing and explaining a complex convention that has an even more tangled and inconclusive legislative history. In short, there also are traps
for the wary in the Convention and, alerted to the risk, all of us can
begin the work of assessing this contribution to international private
law.
RichardE. Speidel*

to be expressed in the same words. The failure to insert language from Article 74 strikes me
as important.
Letter from John Honnold to Richard E. Speidel (Mar. 30, 1983).
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
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